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BURYING THE INEVITABLE DISCLOSURE DOCTRINE IN THE
NOOKS AND CRANNIES: THE THIRD CIRCUIT'S
LIBERAL STANDARD FOR TRADE SECRET
MISAPPROPRIATION IN BIMBO
BAKERIES USA, INC. v. BOYICELLA
JOSEPH J. MAHADY*
I. INTRODUCTION
Chris Botticella had a secret; in fact, Botticella was one of only seven
people in the world with the detailed knowledge of the secret that gener-
ated $500 million in annual sales for his company.' The secret was not
that of a miracle drug, rather it was the original recipe and manufacturing
process to produce the famous "nooks and crannies" in Thomas' English
Muffins.2 When Botticella decided to leave Bimbo Bakeries (Bimbo) and
join Bimbo's competitor, Hostess, Bimbo initiated a legal battle to protect
its trade secret.3 The legal battle that ensued pitted competing public in-
terests against one another and forced the Third Circuit to weigh in on a
very unsettled and controversial area of the law.4
* The author would like to acknowledge Amy M. Dudash for her feedback
throughout the writing process. This Casebrief would not have been possible
without the support of my family and Brooke E. Burns.
1. See Bimbo Bakeries USA, Inc. v. Botticella, No. 10-0194, 2010 WL 571774, at
*3 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 9, 2010) (stating defendant, Chris Botticella, is one of seven peo-
ple with knowledge of all three components needed to replicate Thomas' English
Muffins and that Thomas' English Muffins generated approximately $500 million
in annual sales for Bimbo Bakeries), affid, 613 F.3d 102 (3d Cir. 2010).
2. See id. (noting defendant had intimate knowledge of secret process for pro-
ducing "nooks and crannies" in Thomas' English Muffins, including knowledge of
"the formula, manufacturing engineering design, and certain process parame-
ters"); id. (noting these components are kept separate from information about
other components in order to protect trade secret).
3. See id. at *2 (describing employment agreement Botticella reached with In-
terstate Brands Corporation, predecessor company to Hostess Brands, Inc.).
While still employed as Bimbo's Vice President of Operations for California, and as
one of five key executives in the Western region, Botticella received an employ-
ment offer from Interstate Brand Corporation (IBC) for the position of Vice Presi-
dent of Bakery Operations, East. Id. at *1. Botticella accepted the offer with IBC
on or around October 15, 2009, but failed to inform Bimbo untilJanuary 14, 2010.
Id. at *2. At that time, Botticella did not inform anyone that he intended to join
Hostess, one of Bimbo Bakeries three largest competitors. Id.
4. See Lawrence I. Weinstein, Revisiting the Inevitability Doctrine: Where Can a
Former Employee Who Never Signed a Non-Compete Agreement Nor Threatened to Use or
Disclose Trade Secrets Be Prohibited from Working for a Competitor?, 21 Aa. J. TRIAL An-
voc. 211, 213 (1997) (discussing tension in trade secret law between strong public
policy favoring employee's right to career mobility and public policy encouraging
corporate innovation and invention by protecting trade secrets).
(699)
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In recent years, company executives and government officials have
begun paying closer attention to the valuable trade secret knowledge pos-
sessed by American employees as a result of the economic downturn, im-
proved portability of digital information, and the continuous wave of
technology startups.5 While protecting trade secrets is vital to the compet-
itiveness of the U.S. economy, poor economic conditions and a weak job
market have garnered greater support for public policy favoring employee
mobility.6
A. The Inconsistent Body of Trade Secret Law and the
Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine
Despite the parallels to patent law, which is governed by federal law,
state law largely regulates misappropriation of trade secrets.7 Even with
5. See Laura Ernde, Economy Leads Companies to Sue Ex-Workers, DAILYJ., Oct.
27, 2009, http://www.tradesecretslaw.com/uploads/file/Economy%20Leads%20
Companies%20to%2OSue%2OEx-Workers.PDF ("The economy ... has company
executives asking more questions about protecting trade secrets. When money is
scarce, businesses are frantic to hold onto any advantage they have . . . ."); James
M. Von Bergen, Employee Confidentiality a Bigger Issue in a Tougher Economy, Philly.
com, Nov. 15, 2010, http://articles.philly.com/2010-11-15/business/24955767 1
english-muffins-employee-rival-firm (discussing economic impact on trade secret
litigation); see also Bruce T. Atkins, Trading Secrets in the Information Age: Can Trade
Secret Law Survive the Internet?, 1996 U. ILL. L. REv. 1151, 1151 ("'With a few keys-
trokes, a disgruntled employee of a business can send a multimillion dollar trade
secrets into cyberspace . . . .' (quoting Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S.
470, 487 (1974))); Christopher Drew, U.S. Companies Are at Risk of Spying by Their
Own Workers, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 2010, at Al (quoting Assistant Attorney General
Lenny A. Breur, claiming that "[i]n the new global economy, [U.S.] businesses are
increasingly targets for theft .... In order to stay a leader in innovation, we've got
to protect these trade secrets"); Remarks as Prepared for Delivery by Attorney General
Eric Holder at the Rio De Janeiro Prosecutor General's Office, PR NEWSwIRE, Feb. 24,
2010, http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/remarks-as-prepared-for-deliv-
ery-by-attorney-general-eric-holder-at-the-rio-de-janeiro-prosecutor-generals-office-
85201852.html ("When [a] trade secret is stolen to benefit another foreign power,
[the U.S.] competitiveness in the world economy-and even our national secur-
ity-can be threatened."). The commentator further explains that once a trade
secret is lost on the Internet, it is no longer a trade secret, and thus loses all protec-
tions. See Ernde, supra (listing number of U.S. companies that have fallen victim to
economic espionage in connection with foreign countries, primarily China). In
the past decade, companies like Ford, General Motors, DuPont, Valspar, and Mo-
torola have all had to deal with the theft of trade secrets. See id.
6. Eleanore R. Godfrey, Note, Inevitable Disclosure of Trade Secrets: Employee Mo-
bility v. Employer's Rights, 3 J. HIGH TECH. L. 161, 168 (2004) (observing that
" [t]raditionally, the courts favored employee mobility over the rights of employers
to protect their trade secrets").
7. See Kurt M. Saunders, Can You Keep a (Trade) Secret?-The Pennsylvania Uni-form Trade Secrets Act, PA. B. Ass'N. Q., Oct. 2004, at 139, 139 ("Unlike patent, copy-
right, and trademark law, trade secret protection is exclusively the domain of state
law."); Godfrey, supra note 6, at 161 (stating that trade secret law is governed by
state law, rather than federal law); see also David S. Almeling, Four Reasons To Enact
a Federal Trade Secrets Act, 19 FoRDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENr. L.J. 769, 770
(2009) ("Trade secrets stand alone as the only major type of intellectual property
governed primarily by state law."); Joel Leeman, Federal Preemption Has Its Limits:
700
2
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 56, Iss. 4 [2012], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol56/iss4/2
most states adopting the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA), the applica-
tion, definitions, and requisite elements necessary to bring a claim of trade
secret misappropriation vary amongst states.8 The UTSA includes an in-
junctive provision providing that "actual or threatened misappropriation
[of trade secrets] may be enjoined."9 Although rarely black and white, an
actual misappropriation of trade secrets has proved to be much less of a
judicial headache than the inconsistent analysis courts have applied to de-
termine whether a threat of misappropriation exists."o In determining
whether to issue an injunction based on a threat, a number of courts
around the country have invoked the oft-cited and highly controversial
inevitable disclosure doctrine."
The inevitable disclosure doctrine dates back almost a century and
"permits a trade secret owner to prevent a former employee from working
for a competitor . .. by demonstrating the employee's new job duties will
State Law Governs Theft of Trade Secrets Even When a Patent Is Involved, IP UPDATE
(Bromberg Sustein LLP, Boston, Ma.), Feb. 2009, available at http://www.sunstein
law.com/media/FEB09FedPreemption.pdf (noting that "recent Tenth Circuit
opinion reinforces the prevailing rule that state law claims of misappropriation of
trade secrets are not preempted by federal patent law just because patents figure
into the evidence").
8. SeeJonathan R. Chally, Note, The Law of Trade Secrets: Toward a More Efficient
Approach, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1269, 1282-83 (2004) (noting trade secret law remains
state law phenomenon as there is no nationally recognized definition of elements
required to obtain protection). The commentator goes on to state, however, that
by looking at the UTSA, Restatement (First) of Torts, and the Restatement (Third)
of Unfair Competition, one can extract three elements necessary to obtain protec-
tion of trade secrets: "(1) the trade secret must be of a certain broadly character-
ized subject matter; (2) the trade secret must be secret; and (3) the trade secret
must be misappropriated." See id. at 1282-83; see also Marina Lao, Federalizing Trade
Secrets Law in an Information Economy, 59 OHIo ST. L.J. 1633, 1649-50 (1998) (stating
that "USTA never won the support of all of the states, and even the states that did
adopt the UTSA modified it, sometimes substantially, before enactment"). Lao
concludes that with these modifications of the USTA occurring at the state legisla-
tive level, the "law on trade secret misappropriation continues to vary from jurisdic-
tion to jurisdiction." See Lao, supra at 1650; see also Carl Pacini & Raymond Placid,
The Importance of Trade Secrets Laws in Deterring Trade Secret Espionage, 7 BUFF. INTELL.
PROP. L.J. 101, 125-27 (2009) (listing factors trade secret claimant must show to get
injunctive relief). Companies bringing a trade secret claim most commonly seek
injunctive relief, prohibiting the disclosure and use of the trade secret by outgoing
employees and, in more extreme cases, preventing the outgoing employee from
commencing employment with a competitor. In trade secret misappropriation
cases, claimants must show four elements to be awarded injunctive relief: "(1) a
likelihood of success on the merits; (2) irreparable injury; (3) such injury out-
weighs any harm to the defendant; and (4) the injunction would not harm the
public interest." Pacini & Placid, supra at 125.
9. UNIF. TRADE SECRETs Acr § 2(a) (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 619 (2005).
10. For a discussion of the different approaches courts have taken to deter-
mine threatened disclosure, see infra notes 55-72 and accompanying text.
11. See Godfrey, supra note 6, at 178 (describing inevitable disclosure doctrine
as controversial); David Lincicum, Note, Inevitable Conflict?: California's Policy of
Worker Mobility and the Doctrine of "Inevitable Disclosure", 75 S. CAL. L. REv. 1257,
1263-64 (2002) (noting inevitable disclosure doctrine has been met with contro-
versy as result of which courts disagree over how doctrine should be analyzed).
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inevitably cause the employee to rely upon knowledge of the former em-
ployer's trade secrets." 12 The doctrine has plenty of critics, in part be-
cause courts have applied it inconsistently across the country.' 3 Further,
critics contend that the doctrine creates an ex post facto non-compete
agreement and undermines the employee's fundamental right to move
freely and pursue his or her livelihood.' 4 The application of the doctrine,
if applicable at all, varies greatly by state.' 5 As a result, choice of law provi-
12. Whyte v. Schlage Lock Co., 125 Cal. Rptr. 2d 277, 281 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002)
(emphasis added).
13. See Elizabeth A. Rowe, When Trade Secrets Become Shackles: Fairness and the
Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine, 7 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 167, 170 (2005) ("The
crux of the opposition to the doctrine ... is that it is not fair to enjoin an individ-
ual from earning a living . . . and when the cases and outcomes are inconsistent
and unpredictable."); see also Godfrey, supra note 6, at 167 (noting that "states do
not enforce the doctrine consistently and jurisdictions never developed a consis-
tent set of criteria for its application"); Brandy L. Treadway, Comment, An Over-
view of Individual States' Application of Inevitable Disclosure: Concrete Doctrine or
Equitable Tool?, 55 SMU L. REv. 621, 622 (2002) (noting that no two states enforce
same version of inevitable disclosure doctrine).
14. See Del Monte Fresh Produce Co. v. Dole Food Co., 148 F. Supp. 2d 1326,
1337 (S.D. Fla. 2001) ("Absent evidence of actual or threatened misappropriation,
a court should not allow a plaintiff to use inevitable disclosure as an after-the-fact
noncompete agreement to enjoin an employee from working for the employer of
his or her choice."); IBM Corp. v. Seagate Tech., Inc., 941 F. Supp. 98, 101 (D.
Minn. 1992) ("A claim of trade secret misappropriation should not act as an ex
post facto covenant not to compete."); Susan Street Whaley, Comment, The Inevita-
ble Disaster of Inevitable Disclosure, 67 U. CIN. L. REv. 809, 846 (1999) (stating that
adoption of inevitable disclosure doctrine created dramatic change in employment
context because it conflicts with interest of employee mobility); Stephen L.
Sheinfeld & Jennifer M. Chow, Protecting Employer Secrets and the "Doctrine of Inevita-
ble Disclosure", in WRONGFUL TERMINATION CLAIMS 1999: WHAT PLAINTIFFS AND DE-
FENDANTS HAVE TO KNow, at 367, 423-24 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice, Course
Handbook Ser. No. 600, 1999) (arguing that inevitable disclosure doctrine allows
employers to obtain de facto non-compete agreement). Sheinfeld and Chow cite
Judge Learned Hand to explain the de facto non-compete agreement that results
from applying the doctrine:
[I]t has never been thought actionable to take away another's employee,
when the defendant wants to use him in his own business, however much
the plaintiff may suffer. It is difficult to see how servants could get the
full value of their services on any other terms; time creates no prescriptive
right in other men's labor. If an employer expects so much, he must
secure it by contract.
Id. (quoting Harley & Lund Corp. v. Murray Rubber Co., 31 F.2d 932, 934 (2d Cir.
1929)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Godfrey, supra note 6, at 178
(noting inevitable disclosure doctrine causes employers to shy away from negotiat-
ing non-competition agreements because doctrine does not require time or geo-
graphic limits in order to be enforceable).
15. See Tracy Bateman Farrell, Applicability of Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine Bar-
ringEmployment of Competitor's FormerEmployee, 36 A.L.R. 6TH 537 (2008) (explaining
variety of situations where doctrine applied and varying definitions and applica-
tions by states).
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sions can be the difference in whether a company can protect a multi-
billion-dollar trade secret.' 6
With its recent decision in Bimbo Bakeries USA, Inc. v. Botticella,17 the
Third Circuit tiptoed around prior precedent and the inevitable disclo-
sure doctrine to establish a very liberal and employer-friendly standard for
finding misappropriation of trade secrets. 18 The Third Circuit's holding
puts into question the role of the inevitable disclosure doctrine in Penn-
sylvania and further empowers companies to protect trade secrets, while
simultaneously hindering the free mobility of employees in a sluggish
economy.' 9 Part II of this Casebrief summarizes the development of the
inevitable disclosure doctrine and explores the adoption and rejection of
the doctrine by various judicial districts, including Pennsylvania.20 Part III
analyzes the Third Circuit's reasoning in Bimbo Bakeries, detailing the
court's determination of the proper standard courts must apply to deter-
mine whether a threat exists. 21 Part IV discusses the broader policy impli-
cations of the court's decision and how employers and employees in
Pennsylvania should interpret the law. 22 Part V concludes with a discus-
sion on how the media and legal community have reacted to this
decision.23
II. BACKGROUND
A. Defining What Constitutes a Trade Secret
Since the end of the nineteenth century, trade secret law in America
has developed as an "amalgam of contract, property, and tort law princi-
16. See David S. Almeling et al., A Statistical Analysis of Trade Secret Litigation in
Federal Courts, 45 GoNz. L. REv. 291, 312 (2009) (concluding choice of law disputes
occur in over ten percent of cases); William Lynch Schaller, Secrets of the Trade:
Tactical and Legal Considerations from the Trade Secret Plaintiffs Perspective, 29 REv.
LITIG. 729, 786-89 (2010) (discussing choice of law provisions in trade secrets
claims). Almeling and his co-authors believe that the "increasing prevalence of
choice-of-law disputes is a critique of the current, state-based system and one of the
many arguments in favor of federalizing trade secret law and adopting a Federal
Trade Secrets Act." Almeling et al., supra, at 312.
17. 613 F.3d 102 (3d Cir. 2010).
18. See id. at 113 (holding that under Pennsylvania law, "court conducting [an
inquiry into determining whether to grant injunctive relief in a trade secret case]
has discretion to enjoin a defendant from beginning new employment if the facts
of the case demonstrate a substantial threat of trade secret misappropriation").
19. For a discussion of the impact the holding will have on employers and
employees, see infra notes 141-46 and accompanying text.
20. For a discussion of the birth of the doctrine and its treatment by multiple
jurisdictions, see infra notes 24-100 and accompanying text.
21. For a discussion of the court's analysis, see infra notes 101-40 and accom-
panying text.
22. For a discussion of the standard applied by the court and its importance
for employers, see infra notes 141-58 and accompanying text.
23. For a discussion of the attention the opinion has garnered in the media
and legal community, see infra notes 159-61 and accompanying text.
7032012] CASEBRIEF
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ples."24 In 1939, the Restatement (First) of Torts sought to provide uni-
formity in the area of trade secret law by defining what constitutes a trade
secret and what factors courts should consider in ascertaining whether the
information is protected.2 5 The Restatement defined a trade secret as:
any formula, pattern, device or compilation of information which
is used in one's business, and which gives him an opportunity to
obtain an advantage over competitors who do not know or use it.
It may be a formula for a chemical compound, a process of man-
ufacturing, treating or preserving materials, a patter for a ma-
chine or other device, or a list of customers.2 6
Despite the drafters' best efforts, the Restatement failed to harmonize
the conflicting trade secret law applied by the states.27 In 1979, the Na-
tional Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws published the
UTSA. 28 Using the Restatement as its foundation, the UTSA provided a
modified definition of trade secrets.2 9 Since its inception in 1979, the
UTSA has been adopted by forty-six states and the District of Columbia;
24. See Sheinfeld & Chow, supra note 14, at 377-78 (stating that trade secret
law has not evolved from uniform body of law, but rather has "developed as a
dynamic amalgam of contract, property, and tort law principles").
25. See id. at 378 (stating Restatement (First) of Torts was effort to make law of
trade secrets more uniform). In determining whether the information at issue is a
trade secret, courts should consider:
1. the extent to which the information is known outside of the business;
2. the extent to which it is known by employees and others involved in
the business;
3. the extent of measures taken to guard the secrecy of information;
4. the value of information to the owner and the owner's competitors;
5. the amount of effort or money expended by the owner in developing
the information; and
6. the ease of difficulty with which the information could be properly
acquired or duplicated by others.
Id. at 378-79 (quoting RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939)).
26. Id. at 378 (quoting § 757 cmt. b).
27. See Almeling, supra note 7, at 772 (claiming that despite widespread ac-
ceptance by courts, Restatement approach "failed to achieve uniformity because
[it] was not binding, and thus courts were free to accept or reject its various
principles").
28. See Christopher Rebel J. Pace, The Case for a Federal Trade Secrets Act, 8
HARv. J.L. & TECH. 427, 432-33 (1995) ("The National Conference's intent in pro-
posing the UTSA was not to revolutionize the standards for trade secret misappro-
priation, but to codify existing common law standards and to provide a uniform
approach to trade secret misappropriation among the states.").
29. The UTSA defined a trade secret as
information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device,
method, technique, or process, that:
(i) derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from
not being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by
proper means by, other persons who can obtain economic value
from its disclosure or use, and
(ii) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circum-
stances to maintain its secrecy.
704 [Vol. 56: p. 699
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Texas, New Jersey, New York, and Massachusetts have not yet adopted the
UTSA.3 0
While early trade secret cases dealt primarily with the protection of
technical secrets, modern courts afford protection to a broad class of busi-
ness information as well.3 1 In regards to technical information, courts
have held trade secrets to include plans, designs, manufacturing processes
and methods, product formulas, recipes, and computer software. 3 2 In the
more expansive view, courts have protected business information, includ-
ing cost and pricing information, customer lists, business strategies, and
internal market analyses and forecasts.3 3
UNIF. TRADE SECRETS Acr § 1(4) (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 538 (2005). But see
Katarzyna A. Czapracka, Antitrust and Trade Secrets: The U.S. and the EU Approach, 24
SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 207, 219 (2008) (discussing influence
of Restatement (First) of Torts). The author indicates that the Restatement has
remained influential and "its definition of a trade secret has been almost univer-
sally cited by courts, including the U.S. Supreme Court." Id. (footnote omitted);
see, e.g., Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 266 (1979) (stating Re-
statement definition of trade secrets is most commonly accepted definition);
Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 474 (1974) (noting Restatement's
definition of trade secrets is widely relied upon).
30. See Barry L. Cohen, The Current Status of the Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine,
LANDSLIDE, Nov./Dec. 2010, at 40, 41 (noting that all but four states have adopted
UTSA).
31. See Treadway, supra note 13, at 625 (noting inevitable disclosure doctrine
traditionally dealt with "highly skilled employee[s] in a technical industry," but in
PepsiCo Inc. v Redmond, court applied doctrine to enjoin business manager re-
sponsible for marketing plans). Compare E. I. duPont de Nemours & Co. v. Am.
Potash & Chem. Corp., 200 A.2d 428, 534-35 (Del. Ch. 1964) (discussing case in-
volving employee with knowledge relating to manufacture of titanium dioxide pig-
ments by its chloride process), and Eastman Kodak Co. v. Powers Film Prods., 179
N.Y.S. 325, 329-30 (N.Y. App. Div. 1919) (presenting facts involving trade secrets
dealing with both manufacturing process and formulas for film-making products),
and B. F. Goodrich Co. v. Wohlgemuth, 192 N.E.2d 99, 101-02 (Ohio Ct. App.
1963) (discussing case involving materials engineer who developed pressure-space
suits), with PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262, 1265 (7th Cir. 1995) (identify-
ing strategic business plans and annual operating plans as containing trade
secrets).
32. See, e.g., Vermont Microsys., Inc. v. Autodesk, Inc., 138 F.3d 449, 450 (2d
Cir. 1998) (finding computer software program to be protectable trade secret);
Dynamic Microprocessor Assocs. v. EKD Computer Sales, 919 F. Supp. 101, 106
(E.D.N.Y. 1996) (finding source codes of computer program constitutes trade se-
cret); Monovis, Inc. v. Aquino, 905 F. Supp 1205, 1224-31 (W.D.N.Y. 1994) (find-
ing design and manufacturing information for single-screw compressor
protectable trade secret); Mason v. Jack Daniel Distillery, 518 So. 2d 130, 134 (Ala.
Civ. App. 1987) (finding restaurant owners mixed drink recipe for "Lynchburg
Lemonade" to be trade secret, despite use of common ingredients); Brescia v.
Angelin, 90 Cal. Rptr. 3d 842, 854 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009) (finding company's pud-
ding formula and manufacturing process to be trade secrets); 205 Corp. v. Bran-
dow, 517 N.W.2d 548 (Iowa 1994) (finding recipe for pizza sauce and crust to be
trade secret). But see Buffets, Inc. v. Klinke, 73 F.3d 965, 969 (9th Cir. 1996) (find-
ing chain restaurant's recipes not to be trade secrets because recipes "lack[ed] the
requisite novelty and economic value for trade secret protection").
33. See, e.g., Black, Sivalls & Bryson, Inc. v. Keystone Steel Fabrication, Inc.,
584 F.2d 946, 952 (10th Cir. 1978) ("Confidential data regarding operating and
7
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B. The Historical Development of the Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine and the
Seminal Case: PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond
Under the UTSA, courts may enjoin the actual or threatened misap-
propriation of trade secrets. 3 4 It is under the threatened misappropria-
tion of trade secrets that the inevitable disclosure doctrine finds its
existence.35 Commentators and courts disagree on how precisely the two
are related, but a majority favor the view that the inevitable disclosure doc-
trine is one of the means of proving threatened disclosure.3 6
pricing policies can also qualify as trade secrets."); Saye v. Old Hill Partners, Inc.,
478 F. Supp. 2d 248, 274 (D. Conn. 2007) (finding business methods to be trade
secrets); Avery Dennison Corp. v. Kitsonas, 118 F. Supp. 2d 848, 854 (S.D. Ohio
2000) (finding customer list to be trade secret under Ohio law, which adopted
version of UTSA); Leo Silfen, Inc. v. Cream, 278 N.E.2d 636, 640 (N.Y. 1972)
("[W] here the customers are not known in the trade or are discoverable only by
extraordinary efforts courts have not hesitated to protect customer lists and files as
trade secrets."); see also Robert G. Bone, A New Look at Trade Secret Law: Doctrine in
Search ofJustification, 86 CAL. L. REv. 241, 248 (1998) (noting courts have protected
non-technical information including customer lists, pricing information, business
methods and plans, and marketing research data). But see Sw. Stainless, LP v. Sap-
pington, 582 F.3d 1176, 1189 (10th Cir. 2009) (finding pricing information not to
be trade secret because company allowed customers and vendors to disclose pric-
ing information).
34. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS AcT § 2(a) (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 619
(2005) ("Actual or threatened misappropriation may be enjoined.").
35. See RANDAL E. KAHNKE ET AL., FAEGRE & BENSON LLP, DOCTRINE OF INEVI-
TABLE DISCLOSURE 6 (Sept. 2008), available at http://www.faegre.com/webfiles/In-
evitable%20Disclosure.pdf ("The inevitable disclosure doctrine arises out of the
concept of threatened misappropriations . . . .").
36. See id. (stating that courts and commentators differ in how they interpret
relationship between threatened misappropriation and inevitable disclosure);
Rowe, supra note 13, at 181 (noting that commentators appear confused over
whether two theories are same theory or two separate theories before concluding
that "[t]he belief that the two theories are separate and distinct is misplaced");
Jennifer L. Saulino, Note, Locating Inevitable Disclosure's Place in Trade Secret Analysis,
100 MICH. L. REv. 1184, 1193 (2002) (arguing that "distinction between inevitable
disclosure and threatened misappropriation is one of remedy"); see also PepsiCo, 54
F.3d 1262 (applying same analysis and using inevitable disclosure and threatened
misappropriation interchangeably); Barilla Am., Inc. v. Wright, No. 4-02-CV-90267,
2002 WL 31165069, at *9 (S.D. Iowa July 14, 2004) (applying stricter standard for
inevitable disclosure over threatened disclosure and finding that "the inevitable
disclosure doctrine appears to be aimed at preventing disclosures despite the em-
ployee's best intentions, and the threatened disclosure doctrine appears to be
aimed at preventing disclosures based on the employee's intention"); Del Monte
Fresh Produce Co. v. Dole Food Co., 148 F. Supp. 2d 1326, 1335 (S.D. Fla. 2001)
(analyzing facts of case under assumption that inevitable disclosure and
threatened misappropriation are two different theories and threatened misappro-
priation requires proof beyond inevitability); Whyte v. Schlage Lock Co., 125 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 277, 294 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (stating inevitable disclosure doctrine "can-
not be used as a substitute for proving actual or threatened misappropriation of
trade secrets"); Novell, Inc. v. Timpanogos Research Grp., Inc., 46 U.S.P.Q. 2d
(BNA) 1197, 1215-16 (Utah Dist. Ct. 1998) (determining inevitable disclosure is
basis upon which threatened misappropriation can be proven).
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The inevitable disclosure doctrine is something of a recent phenome-
non despite being around for nearly a century. The principles of the doc-
trine were first established in Eastman Kodak Co. v. Powers Film Products,
Inc.,3 7 in 1919.38 In Eastman Kodak, the court upheld a non-competition
and confidentiality agreement signed by the defendant.39 The court
noted that granting injunctive relief merely prohibiting disclosure would
be ineffective because, in performing services for a competitor, the defen-
dant would necessarily impart Kodak's trade secrets. 40 The doctrine laid
dormant until the Delaware Chancery Court's 1964 decision in E. I. duPont
de Nemours & Co. v. American Potash & Chemical Corp.4 1 The court stated
that in a trade secret case "the degree of probability of disclosure, whether
amounting to an inevitability or not, is a relevant factor to be considered
in determining whether a 'threat' of disclosure exists." 4 2 Although ulti-
mately decided on other grounds, E. L duPont is cited along with Eastman
Kodak as the foundation of the inevitable disclosure doctrine. 4 3 It would
be another thirty-five years of general dormancy before the Seventh Cir-
cuit invoked the doctrine in PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond.44
In PepsiCo, the Seventh Circuit expanded the inevitable disclosure
doctrine's reach to the protection of non-technical information. 4 5 Pep-
siCo sought a preliminary injunction to prevent a former employee from
divulging trade secrets and commencing employment with a fierce com-
petitor in the sports drinks market.46 The Seventh Circuit analyzed the
case under the Illinois Trade Secret Act (ITSA), modeled after the
UTSA.4 7 The court established that "a plaintiff may prove a claim of trade
37. 179 N.Y.S. 325 (N.Y. App. Div. 1919).
38. See id.; see also Godfrey, supra note 6, at 161 (discussing origins of inevita-
ble disclosure doctrine).
39. See Eastman Kodak, 179 N.Y.S. at 330-31 (granting temporary injunction).
40. See id. at 330 (stating defendant could not remain loyal to former em-
ployer and new employer without revealing former employer's trade secrets).
41. 200 A.2d 428 (Del. Ch. 1964).
42. Id. at 436.
43. See Godfrey, supra note 6, at 168-70 (citing E. I. duPont and Eastman Kodak
as foundation of inevitable disclosure doctrine).
44. 54 F.3d 1262 (7th Cir. 1995).
45. See Michael R. Levinson, Inevitable Disclosure: Inquiring into the Minds of For-
mer Employees, CBA REc., May 2002, at 34, 34 ("Though cases dating back to the
1960's are based on inevitable disclosure principles, the Seventh Circuit's 1995
decision in PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond brought the doctrine to life and attorneys in
many states . . . are asserting inevitable disclosure claims in great numbers." (cita-
tion omitted)).
46. See PepsiCo, 54 F.3d at 1263 (indicating that PepsiCo sought injunction
preventing employee of ten years from divulging trade secrets and commencing
work with competitor Quaker Oats Company relating to beverage pricing, market-
ing, and distributions).
47. See id. at 1267 (determining Illinois Trade Secrets Act (ITSA) governs
trade secret claim at issue). Compare 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. 1065/3(a) (2011) (pro-
viding for injunctions against "actual or threatened misappropriation" of trade
secrets), with UNIF. TRADE SECRETs ACT § 2(a) (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 619
(2005) (same).
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secret misappropriation by demonstrating that defendant's new employ-
ment will inevitably lead him to rely on the plaintiffs trade secrets." 48
Under this standard, the court determined that PepsiCo demonstrated a
likelihood of success in its trade secret misappropriation claim. 49 The Sev-
enth Circuit's decision is noteworthy for two reasons: (1) PepsiCo was one
of the first cases to be decided under state law modeled after the UTSA,
and (2) PepsiCo recognized non-technical information as protected trade
secrets.5 0
C. Life After PepsiCo: The Adoption and Rejection of the
Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine
Following PepsiCo, employers around the country were empowered
with a legitimized equitable tool to enjoin former employees from com-
mencing employment with a competitor.5 ' Courts confronting the doc-
trine took a myriad of inconsistent approaches. 52 The inconsistency has
led to a patchwork ofjudicial opinions and a struggle amongst the federal
courts to interpret the applicable state law.5 3
1. Locking the Vault: Courts Adopting the Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine
Jurisdictions adopting the inevitable disclosure doctrine have done so
in a variety of ways. 54 While some courts have adopted a broad application
of the doctrine, other courts have limited its scope to enforce non-compe-
tition agreements or to situations where the employee has acted in bad
48. PepsiCo, 54 F.3d at 1269 (emphasis added).
49. See id. at 1271 ("[T]he district court correctly decided that PepsiCo
demonstrated a likelihood of success on its statutory claim of trade secret
misappropriation.").
50. See Treadway, supra note 13, at 624-25 (discussing importance of PepsiCo
on body of trade secret law). As one of the first cases to be decided under a law
modeled after the UTSA, courts looked to the analysis applied by the court in
PepsiCo as instructive on how to handle misappropriation claims under the UTSA.
See id. at 625 ("PepsiCo clearly established elements for inevitable disclosure, which
gave other courts a standard by which to measure their own application.").
51. See Godfrey, supra note 6, at 173 (noting PepsiCo and greater adoption of
UTSA lead to increased use of doctrine by "expanding the range of situations in
which trade secret law applies").
52. See id. (discussing inconsistent application of doctrine in wake of Pepsico
decision).
53. See, e.g., Victaulic Co. v. Tieman, 499 F.3d 227, 234 (3d Cir. 2007) (inter-
preting Pennsylvania law regarding threatened trade secret misappropriation to
require that disclosure of trade secret be "virtually impossible" (internal quotation
marks omitted)); Del Monte Fresh Produce Co. v. Dole Food Co., 148 F. Supp. 2d
1326, 133-37 (S.D. Fla. 2001) (noting Florida courts have not had opportunity to
consider inevitable disclosure doctrine); Merck & Co. v. Lyon, 941 F. Supp. 1443
(M.D.N.C. 1996) (analyzing North Carolina's treatment of inevitable disclosure
doctrine).
54. See Rowe, supra note 13, at 171-72 (listing different approaches courts
have taken in adopting inevitable disclosure doctrine).
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faith.55 These variations are of critical importance and reflect the ever-
present tension between the protection of valuable trade secrets and en-
couraging employee mobility.5 6
Courts adopting a broader application of the doctrine have done so
in the absence of a non-compete agreement.5 7 In Barilla America, Inc. v.
Wright,5 8 the District Court for the Southern District of Iowa enjoined a
short-term employee of a leading pasta manufacturer from commencing
any employment within the pasta industry for a year.5 9 The injunction was
issued under the inevitable disclosure doctrine, even in the absence of a
non-compete agreement.6 0 In issuing the injunction, the court claimed to
have applied a heightened standard for inevitable disclosure; however, the
end result was still a broad injunction in the absence of a non-compete
agreement.6 '
Although courts have applied the doctrine without the presence of a
non-compete agreement, some courts appear more willing to apply the
doctrine when an employee has consented to such an agreement.62 In
55. For a discussion of the various approaches courts have used in applying
the doctrine, see infra notes 56-71 and accompanying text.
56. See Rowe, supra note 13 at 182-83 (discussing ever-present tension in ap-
plying inevitable disclosure doctrine).
57. See PepsiCo, 54 F.3d at 1264 (noting employee signed confidentiality agree-
ment but making no mention of non-compete agreement); Cardinal Freight Carri-
ers, Inc. v. J.B. Hunt Transport Servs., Inc., 987 S.W.2d 642, 647 (Ark. 1999)
(applying doctrine in absence of non-compete agreement). The Supreme Court
of Arkansas adopted the doctrine and relied heavily on PepsiCo to issue an injunc-
tion, essentially creating an ex post facto non-competition agreement between a
trucking company and its former employee. See Cardinal Freight Carriers, 987
S.W.2d at 647; see also Doebler's Pa. Hybrids, Inc. v. Doebler Seeds, LLC, 88 F.
App'x 520, 523 (3d Cir. 2004) (finding absence of non-compete agreement irrele-
vant because "[the defendants'] liability is not premised on the fact that they com-
peted with [the plaintiff], but rather on the fact they used [the plaintiffs] own
confidential information to compete against them"); Barilla Am., Inc. v. Wright,
No. 4-02-CV-90267, 2002 WL 31165069, at *6 (S.D. Iowa July 5, 2002) (applying
inevitable disclosure doctrine absent non-compete agreement); Merck & Co., 941
F. Supp. 1443 (enjoining former employee from working on particular product
with new employer absent non-compete agreement); Nat'l Starch & Chem. Corp.
v. Parker Chem. Corp., 530 A.2d 31 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987) (same);
DoubleClick, Inc. v. Henderson, No. 116914/97, 1997 WL 731413 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
Nov. 7, 1997) (relying on inevitable disclosure doctrine in part to grant injunction
against two former employees where only one signed non-compete agreement).
58. No. 4-02-CV-90267, 2002 WL 31165069 (S.D. Iowa July 5, 2002).
59. See id. at *1 (noting employee only worked for Barilla for four months but
court entered injunction preventing employee from working in pasta industry for
one year).
60. See id. at *7 (stating employee never signed non-compete or confidential-
ity agreement although it was in employee's employment packet).
61. See id. at *9 (stating inevitable disclosure receives heightened scrutiny over
threatened disclosure doctrine).
62. See, e.g., Estee Lauder Cos. v. Batra, 430 F. Supp. 2d 158, 179-80 (S.D.N.Y.
2006) (applying inevitable disclosure doctrine to enforce non-compete
agreement).
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Branson Ultrasonics Corp. v. Stratman,6 3 the U.S. District Court for the Dis-
trict of Connecticut granted a preliminary injunction after finding the dis-
closure of trade secrets was inevitable in light of the reasonable non-
compete agreement the employee signed.64 More recently, in IBM Corp.
v. Papermaster,65 a federal court in the Southern District of New York relied
on the doctrine to grant a preliminary injunction enforcing a non-compe-
tition agreement signed by an employee of IBM who accepted a position at
Apple. 6 6 The court used the doctrine to find the irreparable harm
needed to issue injunctive relief.6 7
Other courts adopting the doctrine have limited its applications to
situations where the employee has acted in bad faith. 68 In H & R Block
Eastern Tax Services, Inc. v. Enchura,69 the District Court for the Western
District of Missouri interpreted PepsiCo to require a showing of "inevitabil-
63. 921 F. Supp. 909 (D. Conn. 1996).
64. See id. at 913 (applying Connecticut state law to uphold non-compete
agreement where it was likely, if not inevitable, that disclosure would occur). In
addition to finding that disclosure was inevitable, the court found that the non-
compete agreement was reasonable, considering factors like the length and geo-
graphic scope of the restriction. See id.
65. No. 08-CV-9078 (KMK), 2008 WL 4974508 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 21, 2008).
66. See id. (applying inevitable disclosure doctrine to enforce non-compete
agreement); see also Jeffrey S. Klein & Gregory Silbert, The Inevitable Disclosure of
Trade Secrets: The Rebirth of a Controversial Doctrine and Where the Courts Stand, 4
BLOOMBERG L. REP.-LAB. & EMP., no. 3, 2010, available at http://www.weil.com/
files/Publication/92fcb204-d5df489a-97cd-01526a8fb5f4/Presentation/Publica-
tionAttachment/2b30d71b-211d-4clc-b936-0665afa43a89/inevitabledisclosure.
pdf ("Papermaster's application of the inevitable-disclosure doctrine was expansive
[because] it found inevitable disclosure even though the old and new employers
are not competitors, at least as that term is ordinarily understood.").
67. See Paperrnaster, 2008 WL 4974508, at *7 ("Thus, '[e]ven where a trade
secret has not yet been disclosed, irreparable harm may be found based upon a
finding that trade secrets will inevitably be disclosed . . . .' (alteration in original)
(quoting Estee Lauder, 430 F. Supp. 2d at 174)).
68. See Dearborn v. Everett J. Prescott, Inc., 486 F. Supp. 2d 802, 820 (S.D.
Ind. 2007) ("Indiana courts may entertain attempts to use the inevitable disclosure
theory, but [ ] the theory should remain limited to a rare and narrow set of cir-
cumstances in which the departing employee has acted in bad faith in taking or
threatening to take valuable confidential information from the employer."); H & R
Block E. Tax Servs. v. Enchura, 122 F. Supp. 2d 1067, 1075 (W.D. Mo. 2000) (inter-
preting PepsiCo as requiring showing of bad faith in combination with inevitable
disclosure); FMC Corp. v. Cyprus Foote Mineral Co., 899 F. Supp. 1477, 1483
(W.D.N.C. 1995) (interpreting North Carolina law to refuse to apply inevitable
disclosure doctrine "absent some showing of bad faith, underhanded dealing, or
employment by an entity so plainly lacking comparable technology that misappro-
priation can be inferred"); CMI Int'l, Inc. v. Intermet Int'l Corp., 649 N.W.2d 808,
813 (Mich. Ct. App. 2004) ("[F]or a party to make a claim of threatened misappro-
priation, whether under a theory of inevitable disclosure or otherwise, the party
must establish more than the existence of generalized trade secrets and a competi-
tor's employment of the party's former employee who has knowledge of trade
secrets."). But see Merck & Co. v. Lyon, 941 F. Supp. 1443 (M.D.N.C. 1996) (re-
quiring evidence of bad faith only for broad injunction, effectively precluding
competitive employment).
69. 122 F. Supp. 2d 1067 (W.D. Mo. 2000).
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ity in combination with a finding that there is unwillingness to preserve
confidentiality."7 0 Moreover, in Dearborn v. Everettu Prescott, Inc.,7 1 the Dis-
trict Court for the Southern District of Indiana stated, "the [inevitable dis-
closure] theory should remain limited to a rare and narrow set of
circumstances in which the departing employee has acted in bad faith."72
Despite the adoption of the bad faith variable by numerous courts, critics
argue that requiring such a showing undercuts the meaning of the doc-
trine, which seeks to prevent disclosure that is inevitable, regardless of an
employee's intentions.7 3
2. Opening the Vault Door: Courts Rejecting the Doctrine
Despite its adoption by a large majority of jurisdictions around the
country, some jurisdictions remain opposed to the inevitable disclosure
doctrine. 74 Courts rejecting the doctrine cite two interrelated concerns:
(1) the application of the doctrine creates an ex post facto non-compete
agreement, and (2) its application is contrary to public policy favoring
employee mobility.7 5
Courts and commentators opposing the doctrine claim that by apply-
ing it in the absence of a non-compete agreement, courts reward an em-
ployer who failed to consider such protection and punish the employee
who never consented to such an agreement or obtained consideration.7 6
70. See id. at 1075 (interpreting PepsiCo to require more than inevitability
alone). Interpreting PepsiCo, the court found that "inevitability alone is insuffi-
cient to justify injunctive relief; rather, demonstrated inevitability in combination
with a finding that there is unwillingness to preserve confidentiality is required."
Id. Finding no evidence of unwillingness on the part of the employee to preserve
confidentiality, the court found for the employee. See id.
71. 486 F. Supp. 2d 802 (S.D. Ind. 2007).
72. Id. at 820.
73. See Linda K. Stevens, Trade Secrets and Inevitable Disclosure, 36 TORT & INS.
L.J. 917, 933 (2001) (noting that requirement of bad faith element undermines
rationale of inevitable disclosure doctrine, which is intended to protect trade
secrets regardless of party's intent).
74. For a discussion of the courts that disfavor the inevitable disclosure doc-
trine, see infra notes 75-85 and accompanying text.
75. For a discussion of the two interrelated concerns courts have about the
inevitable disclosure doctrine, see infra notes 75-85 and accompanying text.
76. See E. W. Bliss Co. v. Struthers-Dunn, Inc., 408 F.2d 1108, 1112-13 (8th Cir.
1969) (noting injunctions can be granted to protect disclosure of trade secrets but
such protection is "not a substitute for an agreement by the employee not to com-
pete with his employer after the termination of employment"); Am. Airlines, Inc. v.
Imhof, 620 F. Supp. 2d 574, 587 (S.D.N.Y 2009) (rejecting inevitable disclosure
doctrine and noting company's failure in not negotiating reasonable non-compete
agreement); Del Monte Fresh Produce Co. v. Dole Food Co., 148 F. Supp. 2d 1326,
1337 (S.D. Fla. 2001) ("Absent evidence of actual or threatened misappropriation,
a court should not allow a plaintiff to use inevitable disclosure as an after-the-fact
noncompete agreement to enjoin an employee from working for the employer of
his or her choice."); IBM Corp. v. Seagate Tech., Inc., 941 F. Supp. 98, 101 (D.
Minn. 1992) ("A claim of trade secret misappropriation should not act as an ex
post facto covenant not to compete."); Whyte v. Schlage Lock Co., 125 Cal. Rptr.
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The leading case out of California, Whyte v. Schlage Lock Co., 7 7 noted that
the "chief ill in the covenant not to compete imposed by the [doctrine] is
its after-the-fact nature: The covenant is imposed after the employment
contract is made and therefore alters the employment relationship with-
out the employee's consent."78 The California court's analysis in Whyte
has been persuasive to courts in other jurisdictions.7 9
Public policy favoring employee mobility provides an interrelated cri-
tique of ex post facto non-compete agreements.8 0 Several states, including
California, Louisiana, and Maryland, have rejected the inevitable disclo-
sure doctrine in favor of public policy encouraging employee mobility.8 '
In Whyte, the court concluded that, by rejecting the doctrine, they were
"correctly balanc [ing] competing public policies of employee mobility and
protection of trade secrets."8 2 Moreover, in Standard Brands, Inc. v.
2d 277, 281 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (holding that "doctrine is contrary to California
law and policy because it creates an after-the-fact covenant not to compete restrict-
ing employee mobility"); Lejeune v. Coin Acceptors, Inc., 849 A.2d 451, 471 (Md.
2004) (applying analysis of Whyte to find "the application of the doctrine . . . 'cre-
ates a de facto covenant not to compete"' (quoting Whyte, 125 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
292)); see also Victoria A. Cundiff, Recent Developments in Trade Secrets Law, in INrEL-
LECTUAL PROPERTY LAw INSTITUTE 2010, at 785, 803 (PLI Intell. Prop., Course
Handbook Ser. No. 1022, 2010) ("Where the former employer never negotiated a
non-compete agreement, courts are likely to note that if the employer had been as
deeply concerned about the risk of the employee's going to a competitor as it now
professes, it had the means to prevent it: entering into a reasonable non-compete
agreement.").
77. 125 Cal. Rptr. 2d 277 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002).
78. See id. at 293 (finding that doctrine essentially creates non-compete agree-
ment without consent of employee).
79. See Lejeune, 849 A.2d at 470-71 (citing Whyte favorably). In Lejeune, a Mary-
land state court refused to apply the doctrine to enjoin an individual from com-
mencing work with his former employer's competitor in the currency acceptance
industry. See id. at 471. The court cited Whyte favorably and found that applying
the doctrine would empower the employer with a non-compete agreement they
failed to give consideration for and prevent the employee from negotiating the
terms. See id. at 470-71.
80. See Standard Brands, Inc. v. Zumpe, 264 F. Supp. 254, 264 (E.D. La. 1967)
(finding application of doctrine conflicts with Louisiana's support of free labor);
Whyte, 125 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 292 (finding application of doctrine restricts employee
mobility and noting California's strong public policy favoring employee mobility).
81. See Standard Brands, 264 F. Supp. at 264 (rejecting doctrine because of
state policy favoring employee mobility); Whyte, 125 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 292-94
(same); LeJeune, 849 A.2d at 471 (same); see also Gillian Lester & Elizabeth Ryan,
Choice of Law and Employee Restrictive Covenants: An American Perspective, 31 COMP.
LAB. L. & PoL'vJ. 389, 392 (2010) (discussing affect of California's pro-employee
mobility policy). Lester and Ryan note that legal scholars have attributed Califor-
nia's policy favoring employee mobility with "the rapid diffusion of information,
leading to industry-wide technological gains that arguably swamp the investment
disincentives that weak entitlements may engender." Id.
82. See Whyte, 125 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 292-93 (finding in favor of employee mobil-
ity over competing public policy protecting trade secrets); FLIR Sys., Inc. v. Par-
rish, 95 Cal. Rptr. 3d 307, 313 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009) (reinforcing California's
explicit rejection of inevitable disclosure doctrine in favor of "strong public policy
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Zumpe,83 a district court applying Louisiana law recognized the state's
strong public policy in favor of free labor.84 Even if the court had found
disclosure to be inevitable, it would have refused to apply the doctrine
because of "the 'declaration of public policy by [the Louisiana] legislature
against restrictions on the spirit of free labor.' "85
3. Trade Secret Law in Pennsylvania Leading up to Bimbo Bakeries
Pennsylvania joined forty-three states and the District of Columbia
when it adopted the UTSA on February 19, 2004.86 Pennsylvania's treat-
ment of the inevitable disclosure doctrine has confused courts and com-
mentators alike.87 Much of the confusion stems from the Superior
Court's 1982 opinion in Air Products & Chemicals, Inc. v. Johnson.88 In ad-
dressing the employee's appeal on the grounds that the trial court erred
in applying the "inevitably of disclosure" standard, the court decided not
to "adopt the reasoning of the trial court or its use of the term inevita-
ble."89 The court stated: "Under Pennsylvania law, a person may be en-
joined from engaging in employment or certain aspects of his
employment where that employment is likely to result in the disclosure of
information . . . ."9o Ultimately, the court agreed with the trial court that
it would be "impossible" for Johnson to perform his new job without dis-
closing Air Product's confidential information.9 1
The ambiguous reasoning of the Superior Court lends support to at
least two possible standards for enjoining employment: (1) employment is
likely to result in disclosure, or (2) performance of employment is impossi-
ble without disclosure.9 2 A number of courts and commentators claim the
of employee mobility that permits ex-employees to start new entrepreneurial
endeavors").
83. 264 F. Supp. 254 (E.D. La. 1967).
84. See id. at 264 (recognizing Louisiana's strong public policy in favor of em-
ployee mobility).
85. Id. (citation omitted).
86. See Saunders, supra note 7, at 140 (discussing Pennsylvania's adoption of
UTSA in 2004).
87. For a discussion of the confusion over Pennsylvania's seminal case, Air
Products & Chemicals, Inc. v. Johnson, see infra notes 90-91 and accompanying text.
88. See Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Johnson, 442 A.2d 1114, 1124 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1982).
89. See id. (declining to "adopt the reasoning of the trial court or its use of the
term inevitable").
90. See id. at 1120 (emphasis added).
91. See id. at 1125 (agreeing with trial court that "it would be impossible for
the employee to perform his duties at the new employer without disclosing trade
secrets").
92. Compare id. at 1120 ("Under Pennsylvania law, a person may be enjoined
from engaging in employment or certain aspects of his employment where that
employment is likely to result in the disclosure of information, held secret by a
former employer, of which the employee gained knowledge as a result of his for-
mer employment situation."), with id. at 1122 ("It would be impossible to perform
his managerial functions in on-site work without drawing on the knowledge he
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opinion represents Pennsylvania's adoption of the inevitable disclosure
doctrine; however, that interpretation conflicts with the court's explicit
rejection of the term inevitable.9 3 The court's evasive language has caused
great confusion over the proper standard in Pennsylvania.9"
Seven years after their ruling in Air Products, the Superior Court inter-
preted Pennsylvania's standard for trade secret misappropriation in Den-
Tal-Ez, Inc. v. Siemens Capital Corp.95 Citing Air Products, the court stated
the "proper inquiry" is "whether there is sufficient likelihood, or substan-
tial threat," of the defendant disclosing trade secrets.9 6 This explicit pro-
nouncement from the Superior Court did not prevent the Third Circuit
from applying a different standard eighteen years later.97 The Third Cir-
cuit's 2007 opinion in Victaulic Co. v. Tieman,98 applying Pennsylvania law,
interpreted Air Products as holding that a broad injunction enjoining em-
ployment "only lies when it is 'virtually impossible ... [for the employee]
to perform his ... duties for [his new employer] without in effect giving
[it] the benefit of [his] confidential information.' 9 9 In citing the same
case, two courts applying Pennsylvania law arrived at two different stan-
dards, one considerably more stringent than the other."oo
possesses of Air Product's confidential information." (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
93. See Bimbo Bakeries USA, Inc. v. Botticella, No. 10-0194, 2010 WL 571774,
at *11 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 9, 2010) ("Pennsylvania courts apply the 'inevitable disclosure
doctrine."' (citing AirProds., 442 A.2d at 1120)), affd, 613 F.3d 102 (3d Cir. 2010);
First Health Grp. Corp. v. Nat'l Prescription Adm'rs, Inc., 155 F. Supp. 2d 194, 236
(M.D. Pa. 2001) (citing PepsiCo and Air Products to find Pennsylvania courts may
enjoin employment under inevitable disclosure doctrine); Cohen, supra note 30, at
43 (identifying Air Products as Pennsylvania case applying inevitable disclosure doc-
trine); Sheinfeld & Chow, supra note 14, at 420 (identifying Air Products as Penn-
sylvania example of expanded scope of doctrine); Treadway, supra note 13, at 635
(claiming Air Products' adopted doctrine). But see Air Prods., 442 A.2d at 1124
("[W]e do not adopt the reasoning of the trial court or its use of the term inevita-
ble . . . ."); Bacharach, Inc. v. Testo, Inc., No. 1257WDAOO, at *9 (Pa. Super. Ct.
Sept. 4, 2001) (copy of unreported memorandum opinion on file with author or
available with Superior Court clerk's office) ("[W]e must dispel [the appellant's
argument], that our holding in Air Products enshrines the 'inevitable disclosure'
doctrine as an inviolable rule of law.").
94. See Gretchen L. Jankowski, The Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine-Inability of For-
mer Employees to Perfor Without Disclosing Confidential Information, PA. B. Ass'N. Q.,
Jan. 2004, at 34, 35 (discussing Air Products decision and confusion regarding Penn-
sylvania's treatment of inevitable disclosure doctrine).
95. 566 A.2d 1214 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989).
96. Id. at 1232 (citing Air Prods., 442 A.2d at 1122-25).
97. SeeVictaulic Co. v. Tieman, 499 F.3d 227, 234 (3d Cir. 2007) (interpreting
Air Products as applying "virtually impossible" standard (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
98. 499 F.3d 227 (3d Cir. 2007).
99. See id. 234 (alterations in original) (quoting Air Prods., 442 A.2d at 1123).
100. Compare Den-Tal-Ez, 556 A.2d at 1232 (interpreting Air Products as estab-
lishing "sufficient likelihood, or substantial threat," standard), with Victaulic, 499
F.3d at 234 (interpreting Air Products as establishing "virtually impossible" standard
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
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III. THE THIRD CIRCUIT'S LIBERAL INTERPRETATION OF THE
INEVITABLE DISCLOSURE DOCTRINE
A. Nooks and Crannies of an Injunction
Chris Botticella began working for Bimbo in 2001 and stayed with the
company until January 13, 2010.101 As part of his employment, Botticella
signed a "Confidentiality, Non-Solicitation, and Invention Assignment
Agreement," but never signed a non-compete agreement. 102 In the fall of
2009, while still employed by Bimbo, Botticella received and accepted an
offer to join one of Bimbo's chief competitors, Hostess Brands, Inc. (Host-
ess).' 0 Botticella continued in his role as Vice President of Operations
for California without informing Bimbo of his pending departure.104
As Vice President of Operations, Botticella continued to have access
to confidential information, including highly restricted codebooks, cost-
reduction strategy plans, and formula optimizations.' 0 5 When Botticella
finally informed Bimbo of his departure, he failed to disclose his intention
to join Hostess. 0 6 After learning of his intentions through other means,
Bimbo asked Botticella to leave the office.' 0 7 Following his departure,
101. See Bimbo Bakeries USA, Inc. v. Botticella, 613 F.3d 102, 104 (3d Cir.
2010) (discussing facts of Botticella's employment). Bimbo Bakeries is one of the
four largest companies in the U.S. baking industry and distributes its products na-
tionally under popular brand names including Thomas', Entenmann's, Oroweat,
and Boboli. See Our Brands, BiMBo BAKERIES USA, http://www.bimbobakeriesusa.
com/our brands/ (last visited Jan. 2, 2012).
102. See Bimbo Bakeries, 613 F.3d at 105 (noting Botticella "agreed not to com-
pete directly with Bimbo during the term of his employment, not to use or disclose
any of Bimbo's confidential or proprietary information during or after the term of
his employment"); id. ("The agreement, however, did not include a covenant re-
stricting where Botticella could work after the termination of his employment with
Bimbo.").
103. See id. at 105-06 (discussing facts of Hostess's offer and Botticella's ac-
ceptance). After accepting the Hostess offer of October 15, 2009, Botticella claims
to have remained working at "Bimbo notwithstanding his acceptance of the Host-
ess position in order to receive his 2009 year-end bonus and to complete two
Bimbo projects for which he had responsibility." See id. at 106 (discussing Bot-
ticella's reasons for remaining at Bimbo).
104. See id. at 105 (discussing Botticella's employment at Bimbo). As Vice
President of Operations for California, Botticella earned an annual salary of
$250,000, was responsible for five production facilities, and oversaw product qual-
ify, cost, labor, and new product development. See id. (discussing Botticella's em-
ployment and compensation).
105. See id. (discussing confidential information Botticella had access to dur-
ing course of employment). As a senior executive, Botticella had access confiden-
tial information regarding products and business strategies, and he was one of only
seven people in the world with the knowledge necessary to replicate Thomas' En-
glish Muffins' "nooks and crannies." See id. (discussing extent of Botticella's
knowledge).
106. See id. at 106 (noting Botticella failed to inform supervisor of his pending
employment with Hostess at time he tendered resignation).
107. See id. (observing Bimbo learned of Botticella's future employment with
Bimbo through Hostess press release announcing Botticella's hiring).
2012] CASEBRIEF 715
17
Mahady: Burying the Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine in the Nooks and Crann
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2012
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
Bimbo hired a computer forensic expert who detected suspicious com-
puter usage leading up to and immediately after Botticella's departure.10 8
Bimbo moved to protect their valuable trade secrets and immediately
sought a preliminary injunction enjoining Botticella from commencing
work with Hostess. 10 9 The district court granted the injunction until the
merits of the case could be heard at trial.1 10
In issuing an injunction, the district court cited Pennsylvania case law
as recognizing the inevitable disclosure doctrine; however, the court ap-
plied the doctrine as a vehicle for requiring a lower standard of proof.'11
The court interpreted Pennsylvania law as requiring a "substantial threat
of disclosure" to issue an injunction." 2 Nevertheless, after establishing a
standard lower than inevitability, the court applied the inevitable disclo-
sure doctrine to the facts to prove a substantial threat of disclosure." 3
The district court's perplexing analysis set the stage for an appeal where
both parties called into question the proper standard." 4
108. See id. at 107-08 (discussing Botticella's suspicious computer usage). The
computer forensic expert hired by Bimbo uncovered a number of instances dem-
onstrating suspicious computer usage. See id. at 107. Specifically, the expert dis-
covered that the person using Botticella's log-in information accessed twelve files
within a span of thirteen seconds, only minutes after Botticella was told by Bimbo
to cease work. See id. According to the expert, this type of usage is consistent with
"copying a group of files at the same time." Id.
109. See id. at 108 (discussing procedural history). Immediately after Bot-
ticella's departure to join Hostess, Bimbo Bakeries brought an action seeking to
protect their trade secrets and then sought preliminary injunctive relief. See id.
110. See Bimbo Bakeries USA, Inc. v. Botticella, No. 10-0194, 2010 WL 571774,
at *16 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 9, 2010) (granting Bimbo's Motion for Temporary and Pre-
liminary Injunction and Other Relief against Botticella), aff'd, 613 F.3d 102. In
granting the injunction, the district court found that issuing a narrow injunction
allowing Botticella to commence work at Hostess would fail to sufficiently protect
Bimbo's trade secrets. See id.
111. See id. at *11 ("When analyzing threatened misappropriation of trade
secrets, Pennsylvania courts apply the 'inevitable disclosure doctrine."' (citing Air
Prods. & Chems., Inc. v.Johnson, 442 A.2d 1114, 1120 (Pa Super. Ct. 1982)). But
see id. at *12 ("Applying the inevitable disclosure doctrine to the instant facts, we
conclude that Bimbo has presented more than sufficient evidence to establish that
there exists at least a substantial threat that Defendant will disclose Bimbo's trade
secrets in the course of his employment at Hostess." (emphasis added)).
112. See id. at *12 (interpreting Pennsylvania case law to require "a substantial
threat of disclosure of a trade secret" to issue injunction under threatened misap-
propriation of trade secrets). In reaching this conclusion the court interpreted Air
Products and Den-Tal-Ez. See id. The court stated that "[its] analysis of the case law
supports the view that the sufficient likelihood or substantial threat of disclosure of
a trade secret need not amount to its inevitability." Id.
113. See id. ("Applying the inevitable disclosure doctrine to the instant facts,
we conclude that Bimbo has presented more than sufficient evidence to establish
that there exists at least a substantial threat that Defendant will disclose Bimbo's
trade secrets in the course of his employment at Hostess." (emphasis added)).
114. Compare Brief of Appellant at 14-27, Bimbo Bakeries USA, Inc. v. Bot-
ticella, 613 F.3d 102 (3d Cir. 2010) (No. 10-1510), 2010 WL 2662989 (arguing that
district court erred in applying inevitable disclosure instead of correct "virtually
impossible" standard), with Brief of Appellee at 32-38, Bimbo Bakeries, 613 F.3d 102
716 [Vol. 56: p. 699
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B. The Third Circuit Looks to the Past for the Correct Recipe for Threatened
Trade Secret Misappropriation
In Bimbo Bakeries USA, Inc. v. Botticella, the Third Circuit attempted to
clarify Pennsylvania's treatment of the inevitable disclosure doctrine
and unravel the district court's analysis.115 After identifying Bimbo's trade
secrets, the court's attention shifted to addressing the appropriate
standard for enjoining employment to prevent trade secret
misappropriation. 16
1. Defining the Correct Standard: A Little Less Inevitable, a Little More Likely
The Third Circuit interpreted the district court's application of the
law as meaning that "Pennsylvania courts apply the 'inevitable disclosure
doctrine' to grant injunctions based not on a trade secret's inevitable dis-
closure but on its likely disclosure."' 17 Troubled with this summation of
the law, the circuit court sought to clarify." 8 The Third Circuit agreed
that Pennsylvania allows a court to enjoin the threatened disclosure of
trade secrets without requiring a plaintiff to show that disclosure is inevita-
ble.119 Nevertheless, when a court issues an injunction for a threat of dis-
closure that is less than inevitable, it is doing so under a lower standard and
not pursuant to the inevitable disclosure doctrine. 120
(No. 10-1510), 2010 WL 2662990 (arguing court correctly applied "likely to result
in the disclosure" standard and not "virtually impossible" standard argued by
Botticella).
115. See Bimbo Bakeries, 613 F.3d at 110-11 (addressing Pennsylvania's treat-
ment of inevitable disclosure doctrine and district court's "paradoxical" analysis).
116. See id. at 110 (noting district court's finding on what constituted as
Bimbo's trade secrets). The Third Circuit approvingly cited the district court's
recognition of the following trade secrets:
a. Information in Bimbo's code books, as well as and including formulas
and designs for Thomas' English Muffins, Oroweat brand products, Sand-
wich Thins products, and other Bimbo products.
b. Bimbo's strategy for increasing profitability, embodied in a road map
in January of 2009, which included line closures, plant closures, new pro-
cess improvements, formula optimizations, and new product launches,
and which achieved cost savings of $75 million over the course of a year.
c. Knowledge of how Bimbo produces bread 'from scratch' instead of
using pre-mixed ingredients.
d. Documents copied by [Botticella] from his work computer onto an
external storage device with no credible explanation ....
e. Bimbo's promotional strategies with respect to specific customers.
f. Bimbo's cost positions.
g. Identities of Bimbo's customers targeted for upcoming bids.
Id. at 110 (internal quotation omitted).
117. See id. at 111 (interpreting district court's standard).
118. See id. (explaining district court's paradoxical conclusion of law).
119. See id. (agreeing with district court that "Pennsylvania law empowers a
court to enjoin the threatened disclosure of trade secrets without requiring a plain-
tiff to show that disclosure is inevitable").
120. See id. (finding that "an injunction granted absent such a showing" of
inevitability is not "issued pursuant to the 'inevitable disclosure doctrine"').
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To define the lower standard the court took a fresh look at Air Prod-
ucts and how it had been interpreted by subsequent cases. 12 1 The court
noted that, at the outset of the Air Products opinion, the Superior Court
stated "that Pennsylvania law permits the issuance of an injunction where a
defendant's new employment 'is likely to result in the disclosure' of a for-
mer employer's trade secrets."12 2 The Third Circuit interpreted the adop-
tion of a "likely" standard as distinct from an "inevitable" standard.' 2 3 In
seeking the proper interpretation of Air Products, the court turned to the
Superior Court's language in Den-Tal-Ez.124 In Den-Tal-Ez, the Superior
Court stated that the "proper inquiry" in determining whether to grant an
injunction to prevent the threatened disclosure of trade secrets is
"whether there is sufficient likelihood, or substantial threat" of a defen-
dant disclosing a trade secret.125 Confident that this reflected the correct
interpretation of Air Products, the court adopted the "sufficient likelihood,
substantial threat" test.12 6
After establishing the correct standard, the court acknowledged Bot-
ticella's contention that the Third Circuit's opinion in Victaulic arguably
calls for a higher standard.' 2 7 Forced to address its recent proclamation
that an injunction enjoining employment is only appropriate when it is
"virtually impossible" for the employee to perform his or her new job with-
out disclosing trade secrets, the court noted in a moment of humility that
its analysis of Pennsylvania law in Victaulic was misguided.12 8 Because the
121. See id. at 111-12 (analyzing Air Products and subsequent cases interpreting
Air Products to determine correct standard).
122. Id. (quoting Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Johnson, 442 A.2d 1114, 1120
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1982)).
123. See id. at 111 (stating injunction granted under "substantial threat" stan-
dard is not issued "pursuant to the 'inevitable disclosure doctrine"'); Jason C.
Schwartz et al., 2010 Trade Secrets Litigation Round-Up, 81 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPY-
RIGHTJ. (BNA) No. 354, at 1, 2 (2011) (discussing court's analysis of inevitable
disclosure doctrine, noting substantial threat standard is separate and distinct from
inevitable disclosure doctrine).
124. See Bimbo Bakeries, 613 F.3d at 114 (discussing Superior Court's subse-
quent interpretation of Air Products in Den-Tal-Ez).
125. Den-Tal-Ez, Inc. v. Siemens Capital Corp., 566 A.2d 1214, 1232 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1989) (citing Air Prods., 442 A.2d at 1122-25).
126. See Bimbo Bakeries, 613 F.3d at 114 (concluding district court applied cor-
rect standard when it determined "Botticella's employment with Hostess would
lead to a 'sufficient likelihood or substantial threat of disclosure of a trade secret'"
(citation omitted)).
127. See id. (addressing Botticella's "understandb[e]" reliance on Victaulic
Co. v. Tieman in arguing for "virtually impossible" standard); see also Brief of Ap-
pellant, supra note 114, at 14-27 (arguing district court erred in applying inevita-
ble disclosure doctrine instead of correct virtually impossible standard).
128. See Bimbo Bakeries, 613 F.3d at 114-15 (discussing Third Circuit's opinion
in Victaulic, conceding that its "review of Victaulic leads us to conclude that in that
case we did not interpret Air Products in a way precisely consistent with Penn-
sylvania state precedents"); see also Victaulic Co. v. Tieman, 499 F.3d 227 (3d Cir.
2007) ("Under Pennsylvania law, a broader injunction only lies when it is 'virtually
impossible ... [for the employee] to perform his .. . duties for [his new employer]
[Vol. 56: p. 699718
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court was not bound by the dictum of an earlier panel opinion, the court
was able to evade the prior misstep.'2 9
Applying the correct standard to the facts of the case, the court found
that the district court had discretion to issue an injunction based on a
threatened misappropriation.13 0 In affirming the injunction the court
considered the similarity of the two jobs and Botticella's suspicious behav-
ior. 3 ' The court agreed with the district court that the two jobs were
"substantially similar," noting that both positions oversee baking opera-
tions and draw a similar salary. 13 2 Furthermore, the court concluded that
the evidence surrounding Botticella's computer usage was indicative of his
intent to use Bimbo's trade secrets.' 3 3 The court emphasized Botticella's
failure to disclose his new position, remaining in a position privy to confi-
dential information, and copying such information to an external storage
device. 3
2. Picking Sides: Employer Protection vs. Employee Mobility
The Third Circuit sought to balance the effect of injunctive relief on a
micro and macro level.' The court weighed the harm an injunction
would have on Botticella versus the harm the absence of an injunction
would have on Bimbo.' 3 6 In weighing the respective harms, the court
found that absent injunctive relief preventing employment, the disclosure
of Bimbo's trade secrets would put them at a competitive disadvantage,
one that a legal remedy could not redress.1 3 7 After identifying a restric-
without in effect giving [it] the benefit of [his] confidential information."' (altera-
tions in original) (quoting Air Prods., 442 A.2d at 1123)).
129. See Bimbo Bakeries, 613 F. 3d at 115 ("It is [ ] well established, however,
that we are not bound by dictum in an earlier panel opinion.").
130. See id. at 119 (affirming district court's granting of Bimbo's motion for
preliminary injunction).
131. See id. at 117 (discussing similarity of Bimbo job and Hostess job); see also
id. at 118 (discussing Botticella's suspicious behavior).
132. See id. at 118 (finding Bimbo job and Hostess job to have similar respon-
sibilities and salary).
133. See id. (discussing Botticella's suspicious computer usage while at
Bimbo).
134. See id. (considering Botticella's bad faith).
135. See id. 118-19 (finding harm posed by threatened disclosure of trade se-
cret outweighed Botticella's harm caused by not being able to commence
employment).
136. See id. (weighing harm to Botticella versus harm to Bimbo if injunction
was granted or not granted, respectively).
137. See id. (balancing harm of injunction on parties). In balancing Bimbo's
harm absent an injunction against the harm imposed on Botticella, the court
found Botticella's harm to be minimized because he was still receiving compensa-
tion from Bimbo. See id.
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tion on employment as a severe remedy, the court found the balance of
harm weighed in Bimbo's favor and upheld the injunction.1 38
The court concluded its analysis by briefly addressing Pennsylvania's
competing public interests: upholding the "inviolability of trade secrets
and enforceability of confidentiality agreements," versus the public inter-
est in "employers being free to hire whom they please and in employees
being free to work for whom they please."13 9 After noting Pennsylvania
courts preferred the latter, the court found in favor of the employer and
the protection of trade secrets.140
M. THE THIRD CIRCUIT'S EMPLOYER-FRIENDLY STANDARD
STRENGTHENS THE SHIELD
A. The Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine Doesn't Make the Cut
The Third Circuit did not apply the inevitable disclosure doctrine in
Bimbo Bakeries, calling into question its future existence in Pennsylvania.1 4 1
Commentators have been quick to point to the court's opinion as a broad
reading of the inevitable disclosure doctrine; however, this reading of the
opinion fails to consider the detailed language of the court.142 In its opin-
ion, the court explicitly stated that an injunction granted under this lower
standard is "not issued pursuant to the inevitable disclosure doctrine; the
two concepts are distinct."1 4 3 Employers bringing trade secret misappro-
priation claims under Pennsylvania law need only show a "substantial
threat of trade secret misappropriation." 144
138. See id. at 119 (noting "that even a temporary injunction prohibiting
someone from pursuing his livelihood in the manner he chooses operates as a
severe restriction on him that a court should not impose lightly").
139. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
140. See id. (finding potential harm to Bimbo Bakeries outweighed temporary
restriction on Botticella's employment).
141. See Schwartz et al., supra note 123 (noting court's finding that injunction
issued under lower "substantial threat" standard is not "issued pursuant to inevita-
ble disclosure doctrine"); Third Circuit Clarifies Availability of Preliminary Injunction to
Prevent Former Employee from Working for a Competitor, LABOR & EMP'T LAwFLASH
(Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, Phila., Pa.), July 30, 2010, at 1 [hereinafter MORGAN
LEWIs LAwFLASH], available at http://www.morganlewis.com/pubs/LEPG Former
EmployeeWorkingForCompetitor LF_- 30jullO.pdf (noting "[t]he court rejected
use of the inevitable disclosure doctrine that would preclude an injunction unless
it would be 'virtually impossible' for an individual to avoid disclosure of trade
secrets in his new position").
142. See Thomas A. Muccifori, The Nooks and Crannies of 'Inevitable Disclosure',
N.J. L.J., Dec. 6, 2010, at 1 (arguing Bimbo Bakeries expands inevitable disclosure
doctrine).
143. See Schwartz et al., supra note 123, at 2 (discussing how Bimbo Bakeries
court distinguished lower standard from inevitable disclosure doctrine); see also
Bimbo Bakeries, 613 F.3d at 111 (noting "we do not consider that an injunction
granted absent such a showing [of inevitability] was issued pursuant to the 'inevita-
ble disclosure doctrine'").
144. Bimbo Bakeries, 613 F.3d at 113.
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Under this liberal standard, if an employer is able to prove under the
circumstances that disclosure is inevitable, it will be able to meet the lower
substantial threat standard.145 While Pennsylvania courts will continue to
grant injunctions if disclosure is inevitable, practitioners seeking to protect
company trade secrets should argue under the lower standard recognized
in Bimbo Bakeries.146
B. Welcome to Pennsylvania: The Perfect Recipe for Protecting Against
Trade Secret Misappropriation
Employers seeking to protect valuable trade secrets should take note
of the Third Circuit's enshrinement of the lower substantial threat stan-
dard and its recognition of Pennsylvania law pursuant to the choice of law
provision in Botticella's employment agreement.' 4 7 Courts generally "de-
fer to choice of law clauses because they are presumed to represent the
express intention of the parties," and will uphold them if the state selected
by the parties has a reasonable connection to the agreement.14 8 In recog-
nizing the choice of law provision in Bimbo Bakeries, the court noted that
the "litigation seems only marginally related to Pennsylvania."14 9 Never-
theless, the selection of Pennsylvania as a choice of law within the trade
secret context is particularly noteworthy for two reasons: (1) Pennsylvania
recognizes a lower standard in trade secret misappropriation and (2)
Pennsylvania, unlike several states including California, does not prohibit
or severely restrict enforcement of non-compete agreements."'o
145. See MORGAN LEWIS LAwFLASH, supra note 141, at 2 (stating employers
should take notice of lower standard).
146. See Schwartz et al., supra note 123, at 2 (noting Pennsylvania law, in addi-
tion to recognizing inevitable disclosure, empowers courts to enjoin disclosures
under lower standard).
147. See MORGAN LEWIS LAwFLASH, supra note 141, at 2 (noting employers in
Pennsylvania should take note of Third Circuit's decision because of low stan-
dard); see also Bimbo Bakeries, 613 F.3d at 105 (noting choice of law provision in
Botticella's employment agreement).
148. See Lester & Ryan, supra note 81, at 397 (discussing court's enforcement
of choice of law provisions); Joseph A. Dougherty, Legal Basics of Restrictive Cove-
nants in Pennsylvania, in RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS AND TRADE SECRETS IN PENN-
SYLVANIA 1, 21 (2009) (discussing choice of law and venue provisions under
Pennsylvania law).
149. See Bimbo Bakeries, 613 F.3d at 111 (noting "litigation seems only margin-
ally related to Pennsylvania," but recognizing choice of law provision anyway).
150. See, CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 16600 (West 2011) ("Except as provided
in this chapter, every contract by which anyone is restrained from engaging in a
lawful profession, trade, or business of any kind is to that extent void."); BRIAN M.
MALSBERGER, SECTION OF LABOR & EMP'T LAw, AM. BAR Ass'N, COVENANTS NOT TO
COMPETE: A STATE-BY-STATE SURVEY 3303 (5th ed. 2006) (noting Pennsylvania en-
forces covenants not to compete to "extent reasonably necessary to protect the
legitimate business interests of the employer"); Lester & Ryan, supra note 81, at
396-97 ("Because the substantive law governing non-compete covenants varies sub-
stantially from state to state, parties often include a choice of law clause, which
expressly designates a particular state's law for resolving future disputes."); see also
MORGAN LEWIS LAWFLASH, supra note 141, at 1 (noting Pennsylvania courts apply
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The facts of Bimbo Bakeries exemplify the impact of selecting Penn-
sylvania as the choice of law in employment agreements where the em-
ployee will be exposed to trade secrets.15 1  Bimbo is a Delaware
corporation with its principal place of business in Pennsylvania, whereas
Botticella is a California resident who was employed by Bimbo in Califor-
nia.152 As previously noted, California has explicitly rejected the inevita-
ble disclosure doctrine because of a strong public policy favoring
employee mobility.15 - Commentators interpreting the Third Circuit's
opinion have contemplated whether Bimbo Bakeries would have received
a different result in California: a more hostile and employee-friendly judi-
cial environment.154 Furthermore, California courts have gone as far as
rejecting a Maryland choice of law provision because it would "allow an
out-of-state employer/competitor to limit employment and business op-
portunities in California."115 By trying the case in Pennsylvania under
Pennsylvania law, Bimbo Bakeries assured greater protection of their trade
secrets under an even lower standard than "inevitable."' 5 6
Therefore, prudent practitioners drafting employment contracts
should include: (1) a reasonable non-compete agreement, (2) a confiden-
tiality agreement, and (3) a choice of law and forum provision having
Pennsylvania law govern the employment agreement.' 5 7 The decision in
favorable standard for employers); Andy Arnold, A Bimbo by Any Other Name: Third
Circuit Upholds "Inevitable Disclosure" Injunction, BEAT YOUR NON-COMPETE (Feb. 12,
2011), http://www.scnoncompetelawyer.com/a-bimbo-by-any-other-name-third-
circuit-upholds-"inevitable-disclosure"-injunction/ (finding court's lower standard
intriguing).
151. See Schwartz et al., supra note 123, at 3 (noting Bimbo Bakeries is notewor-
thy for application of Pennsylvania choice of law clause).
152. See Bimbo Bakeries, 613 F.3d at 104-05 (discussing citizenship of Bimbo
Bakeries and Botticella).
153. See Lester & Ryan, supra note 81, at 392 (discussing California's policy
strongly favoring employee mobility). For a discussion of California's explicit re-
jection of inevitable disclosure doctrine in Whyte, see supra notes 77-82 and accom-
panying text. .
154. See Tresa Baldas, Bimbo Bakeries Seeks Limits on Its Departing Muffin Man,
NAT'L L.J., Jan. 27, 2010 (quoting one California lawyer suggesting Botticella law-
yer "file a parallel action in California declaring that he has a right to compete."
(internal quotation marks omitted)), Schwartz et al., supra note 123, at 3 ("One
wonders if Botticella, who lived and worked in California, could have successfully
brought a declaratory judgment action in California on the theory that application
of Pennsylvania law would violate the public policy of California (which is hostile
to non-compete agreements and to inevitable disclosure arguments).").
155. See Application Grp., Inc. v. Hunter Grp., Inc., 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 73 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1998) (refusing to recognize Maryland choice of law provision because
application of Maryland law to enforce non-compete agreement would be contrary
to fundamental policy of California); Lester & Ryan, supra note 81 at 400-01 (dis-
cussing Application Group court's refusal to uphold non-compete agreement based
on Maryland choice of law provision).
156. See Schwartz et al., supra note 123, at 3 (noting favorable discrepancies
between trying case in Pennsylvania versus California).
157. See id. (discussing steps employers should take in wake of Bimbo Bakeries);
MORGAN LEWis LAwFLASH, supra note 141, at 2 (same); see also Timothy P. Glynn,
722 [Vol. 56: p. 699
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Bimbo Baheies makes the Third Circuit a pro-business jurisdiction and will
likely draw much trade secret litigation into the federal court of Penn-
sylvania in a game of "strategic litigation."15 8
V. CONCLUSION
The Third Circuit's decision in Bimbo Bakeries has garnered plenty of
media attention for its soap opera plot involving corporate America, trade
secrets, theft, deception, and a beloved American breakfast staple.' 59 In
the legal community, the Third Circuit's opinion has been equally as pop-
ular, with practitioners focusing more on the extremely low threshold re-
quired to enjoin employment in a trade secret misappropriation case.' 6 0
The court's liberal standard adds another layer of complexity on to an
already unsettled area of law and strengthens the argument for creating a
Federal Trade Secrets Act.' 6 '
Interurisdicitonal Competition in Enforcing Noncompetition Agreements: Regulatory Risk
Management and the Race to the Bottom, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1381, 1434 (2008)
(discussing "law-as-commodity" competition in employment law).
158. See Lester & Ryan, supra note 81, at 392 (noting "variation among states
in their willingness to enforce non-compete agreements that creates the conditions
for conflict of laws and strategic litigation").
159. See, e.g., Maryclaire Dale, Secret of English Muffin 'Nooks & Crannies' Is Safe
for Now, USA TODAY, July 29, 2010, http://www.usatoday.com/money/industries/
food/2010-07-29-english-muffin-lawsuitN.htm (discussing case); Eamon McNiff,
Thomas'English Muffins' Nooks-and-Crannies Knowledge to Remain Secret for Now, ABC
NEWS, Feb. 25, 2010, http://abcnews.go.com/TheLaw/thomas-english-muffins-
nooks-crannies-knowledge-remain-secret/story?id=9933006 (same); William
Neuman, A Man with Muffin Secrets, but No Job with Them, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 6, 2010,
at Al, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/07/business/07muffin.html?
r=1&scp=1&sq=Botticella&st=cse (same); Bradley Blackburn, Secret English Muffin
Recipe for 'Nooks and Crannies' Safe for Now, ABC NEWS NATION BLOG (July 29, 2010,
12:11 PM), http://blogs.abcnews.com/theworldnewser/2010/07/secret-english-
muffin-recipe-for-nooks-and-crannies-safe-for-now.html (same).
160. Shannon P. Duffy, No Work for You, Muffin Man: Secret Recipe Keeps Exec
From Job Switch, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Feb. 19, 2010, (discussing lower standard
applied by court); Arnold, supra note 150 (finding lower standard to be "most
important aspect" of decision); Lee A. Sevier, Top Level Executives Can Be Enjoinedfrom Commencing Employment with a Competitor If There Is a Substantial Threat of Disclos-
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